Against Self-Contradictory Forms of Specific Philosophies (PHL 123 Essay)

Against Self-Contradictory Forms of Specific Philosophies
Zachary Teela

In this day and age, many people claim that there is no truth. The same people who hold this belief then go about proclaiming that as gospel truth, and being rather difficult towards people who don’t hold the same view. This essay isn’t to say that there is absolute truth, but rather just to say that those people, we’ll call them militant relativists, are rather hypocritical by definition.
Thus, militant relativism is untenable. I will spend the next few pages elaborating on this statement. Of course, relativism is a rather broad term. It is easier to prove that naturalistic atheism leads to a nihilistic or existential attitude towards life and further, to a general relativism in theory. From there, militant forms of these positions can be shown to be inherently untenable.
The easiest way to go about a critique of militant relativism is to evaluate the assumptions leading to it (in theory) and from there to follow through the results of these assumptions. The epistemic assumption that leads to naturalism and the narcissistic assumption that leads to humanism seem to be at odds with each other, but must still be evaluated and shown hypothetically working within the same person.
Naturalism may be a slightly loaded term. A redefinition is in order. Naturalism will describe the philosophy that denies the existence of any idea that is spiritual in nature. Materialism is a better term for this philosophy, but has a more consumption-culture connotation.
Knowledge is a fun word to define within the context of epistemology. It has been defined as properly justified true belief1,2. Where the proper justification comes from is what separates the naturalist from any form of spiritualist. The naturalist holds that proper justification is grounded in empirical experience (e.g. scientific experience), This assumption is sound enough for most naturalists even though it is only self-evident. Many of these naturalists also assume that evolution is a fact. Evolution and a chaotic universe make perfect sense to the naturalist. In fact, these are the only things to be accepted!
According to this line of thinking, evolution happened, and the human race has happily and randomly evolved from its initial state. Because man is inherently built only to propagate the species (as any higher meaning would concede a degree of spirituality), the naturalist joyfully contributes his part to the propagation of the race and moves on with his life. Unfortunately for him, this doesn’t satisfy his desire for meaning or his gut belief that humans have some greater value in the universe. So he decides to pursue a higher valuation of man than his belief system will allow normally.
Perhaps he finds a fellow skeptic such as Kurt Vonnegut, who says, “Some of you may know that I am a Humanist, not a Christian. But I say of Jesus, as all Humanists do, ''If what he said was good and so much of it is absolutely beautiful, what can it matter if he was God or not?'' If Christ hadn't delivered the Sermon on the Mount, with its message of mercy and pity, I wouldn't want to be a human being. I would just as soon be a rattlesnake.”3 This philosophy is remarkably common in popular culture, and so it is this humanistic philosophy of love to which our friend subscribes.
It is here that we put the naturalistic philosophy away for a while and discuss the narcissistic philosophy that leads to humanism. I only call it narcissistic due to the fact that it is self-valuing of the human race. It is a form of self-worship, and little more. Ultimately, it is a kind of philosophy of the gut, as with the aforementioned scientific valuation. It feels right, for whatever reason, to value oneself and one’s species. And it has as much value as any alternative, in regards to initial reasoning. Thus, our naturalistic friend simultaneously accepts this skeptical humanism.
His philosophy is built well enough. Deism still has a sort of leap, and as it is another very easy idea to encounter (practically speaking. No one actually calls themselves a deist anymore) is a nice pseudo-antithesis to naturalistic humanism. They are both tenable philosophies in the same vein as each other.
In defense of deism, the idea of a Creator is very easy to hold, without any need for evidence (because He left long ago). In fact, deism is practically indistinguishable from naturalism, excepting that it is an older, more spiritual philosophy that allows more meaning to man. But our friend, who I will call Steve from now on, is not a deist. He doesn’t technically believe in any inherent meaning within a man, and therein lays his problem.
The existentialists justify this by suggesting that man must make meaning for himself and in doing so value the individual choosing for himself. “Existentialism is a form of humanism”4 according to Sartre, in that the individual human must create himself. The application of the term existentialism generally referred to the “existence before essence” that Sartre always discusses, and the individual’s relation to the universal5.
All this probably seems like a digression into the nature of a distinctly separate philosophy. Existentialism is a necessary part of understanding the dilemma of Steve, because it allows a morality, but also relativism with respect to truth. Every philosophy that Steve can indulge in leaves room for some form of relativism.
Relativism is shorthand for “relativism with respect to truth.6” In short, the belief that man cannot know all truth or that there is no truth to be known. This especially applies to such things as moral truths, which become irrelevant to meaningless (philosophically) people in a spiritless universe. Why is relativism necessary for a humanistic stand? Because an ant certainly doesn’t value humans as much as the human values himself. Because the moon doesn’t exist for the sake of man, nor even does man exist for the sake of the moon. Man exists for man, and the ant for the ant, and the moon for the moon. In order for man to value himself, he must realize that he is the only value to himself.
Relativism can be avoided if man values something higher, and in doing so values himself. That is the premise of the Theist, that man finds his own value by valuing God. The problems of naturalistic humanism are solved by a theistic approach towards life. Steve, however, is not a theist, or a deist, and so his naturalistic humanism must be differently approached.
The problem that relativism faces if it tries to purport itself as true is that it doesn’t leave itself a leg to stand on. If I made a proposition P “no propositions are true,” then P could not be true (or any other proposition D or ~ D). It is a singularly unique form of difficulty this causes. Since he is a naturalist, though, Steve believes that there is truth. As a humanist, only moral truths are relative, not truths grounded in empirical experience (naturalistic knowledge),such as gravity. So P could be redefined as Pm: “no moral propositions are true.” This is not a contradictory proposition, less likely to make logicians cry.
The final step that turns Steve into a militant relativist is moving from Pm as Mw: “Making a moral proposition is morally wrong.” The problem that arises here is the exact same contradiction that made P wrong. In supporting Mw, Steve comes to hold an inherently self-contradictory statement. As such, his whole position dissolves into contradiction.
To be fair to Steve, it isn’t necessary that he be a naturalist, or a humanist. If I take a naturalist named Brian, who reached his position in the same way Steve did, without going further by making the humanistic leap, his argument is different. Brian can hold moral truths by claiming that they have an evolutionary value, or by helping the species to survive. For example, Brian can say “murder is wrong because it prevents the propagation of the species, and eliminates productive members of society.” Or he can ignore moral truths since he only believes in empirical truths, and can spend his life studying those. Brian doesn’t claim that humanity has any inherent value, and so he avoids the contradiction found in Mw.
We have a man named Tom, who is only a humanist. Proposition P can do him in entirely. The reason that Steve wasn’t found contradictory until Mw was because he held that naturalistic knowledge could be true. Tom doesn’t have the naturalistic leanings of Steve though, and cannot claim that naturalistic knowledge is true. Thus, he can state P with a rather straight face, that no proposition is true. That is the problem with the entirely relativistic viewpoint.
Relativism has a fundamental flaw in calling an anti-truth statement true. It is not impossible to claim that something is true. Brian can hold that a statement is empirically true, and Dan the deist can as well. Steve and Tom cannot hold P without holding a proposition as true.
Dan’s deism might offer a solution for Steve. It allows empirical truth, as well as a meaning for mankind, without demanding utter worship of a Creator. It allows room for moral truth without stating specifics. This might be the ideal position for Steve, a naturalistic deism.
All of this is not to say that no atheist can rationally hold moral truths. Although my own standpoint as a theist would love to say that, I cannot reasonably say that. A naturalist can hold a normative belief, that we ought not to kill, or should not steal, for practical reasons. Whether or not he calls it true, he never denies that a moral idea could be true. In fact, he could still empirically justify morality within the science of psychology or opinion polls. Both offer forms of empirical evidence. Whether they are sufficient to make moral claims is up to the naturalist to decide. I personally am in no position to say anything about real moral truths. Essays and books can be written to discuss that kind of material.
Still, Steve cannot make any normative statements without contradicting himself. That is the position I’ve worked to advance. And, if any person really tries to hold Mw, or acts as though he holds it, he falls into Steve’s position.
1Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993) 1-48 2 Edmund Gettier: "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" in Analysis, v. 23.
3Kurt Vonnegut “Agnes Scott Commencement” May 15th, 1999
4Walter Kaufmann, trans., Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (Cleveland, World Publishing Company, 1956), 287-292 (“Existentialism is a form of Humanism”, Sartre)
5 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling Trans. Alastair Hannay (New York, Penguin Group, 1985) 62-65
6 Alvin Plantinga, “What is Christian Philosophy?” November 17th, 2011